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Toward Responsibility in International Health: Death
following Treatment in Rockefeller Hookworm
Campaigns, 1914–1934
STEVEN PALMER*
Late in October 1926, a poor man from Bucamaranga, Colombia, wrote a letter to the
richest man in the world. Juan de la Rosa Quintero Parra informed John D Rockefeller
that his ten-year-old son, Jose ´ Vicente, had “died suddenly as a result of a purge admi-
nistered by the Bureau of Uncinariasis”, the local incarnation of the Rockefeller
Foundation’s global project to eradicate hookworm disease. The death of the boy, who
worked full-time as a streetsweeper for the municipality, had been “a serious blow since
he was the only one who contributed to the support of the family consisting of seven
young children”. Having heard of Mr Rockefeller’s generosity, Quintero appealed to
him for assistance, thanked him in advance for the attention he would give to the matter,
and hoped that Divine Providence would spare the great philanthropist’s life for many
years to come. He mailed the letter to Rockefeller Foundation headquarters at 61 Broad-
way in New York City, the same address where, probably unbeknownst to him, bits of
his son’s organs had been sent following a post-mortem. Quintero Parra’s letter came
to the attention of either the 84-year-old patriarch or his son, John D Rockefeller, Jr,
the Foundation’s president. Their executive secretary, F M Read was instructed to
make inquiries into the death of the child, Jose ´ Vicente Quintero.
1
The men who administered the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Board
(IHB) quickly verified the philanthropy’s role in the death. They had just begun to
keep a set of files dedicated to such fatalities, for Jose ´ Vicente Quintero was not the first
child to die at the hands of the Rockefeller Foundation following treatment with oil of
chenopodium, a vermifuge particularly suited to dislodging hookworms from the gut.
John D Rockefeller and his son would have recalled an earlier incident, also in
Colombia, when on a terrible October Monday in 1920 seven children between the
ages of five and ten, three of them from the same family, died after receiving doses of
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149chenopodium from a Rockefeller dispenser on the hacienda “Argentina” in the coffee
district of Antioquia.
2 At the time the Rockefeller Foundation pronounced it “one of
the most tragic accidents in the history of hookworm treatment”.
3 The medical directors
of the IHB were already aware, however, that these deaths were less accident than maca-
bre statistical concentration in a clear pattern of death following treatment with oil of
chenopodium that had stalked their global campaign against hookworm disease almost
since its inception. Between 1914 and 1934, when the organization ceased using the ver-
mifuge, the IHB documented over 200 deaths from oil of chenopodium intoxication,
more than 80 per cent suffered by children twelve years of age and under.
The following pages can be read as an inquiry into the deaths of people around the
world, most of them children, who were fatally poisoned by an ill-advised dosage of
this first mass medication of international health. A number of scholars of Rockefeller
public health have commented on isolated cases to underscore the potential dangers of
the treatment for hookworm disease, or to call attention to the callous official response
to such deaths (most often the victims or their poor health were blamed).
4 I explain
why these fatalities occurred regularly over two decades, and explore the changing
ways that the IHB and the Rockefeller Foundation reacted to them. The internal investi-
gation into Jose ´ Vicente Quintero’s death, and subsequent debate within the Foundation
and the IHB over organizational responsibility and the propriety of compensating the
father, also point us to a broader issue raised by the chenopodium fatalities: the evolution
of the philanthropy’s engagement with harmful outcomes caused by their international
public health programmes.
The IHB was not operating in an ethical or legal vacuum, but neither did its officers
have at their disposal a ready-made normative framework for international treatment
and research. On the surface, and in formal terms, the organization elided the question
by conforming to the norms of the foreign jurisdictions in which they operated. Infor-
mally, however, senior administrators and field supervisors worked out modes of thera-
peutic and experimental treatment with oil of chenopodium that, if amorphous,
contradictory and motivated more by expediency than morality, traced an early pattern
of ethical choices made by an international medical agency. An analysis of the oil of che-
nopodium files reveals an organizational structure that had no mechanism for effectively
translating scientific evidence into safer field protocol. These problems were magnified
by what we might call the “meta-experimentalism” of Rockefeller International Health,
a dimension nicely revealed in the chenopodium files. Because the IHB hookworm era-
dication programme was itself conceived as an open-ended experiment, all treatment was
understood as involving an experimental dimension. Those who died from overdoses of
chenopodium were, in this sense, victims of a loose, multi-purpose and vaguely articu-
lated global experiment whose objectives were simultaneously about everything in
2‘Report on seven deaths among twelve cases
of chenopodium poisoning in Colombia’, RG 5, series
3, box 27, folder 164, RFA-RAC.
3Wilbur A Sawyer, ‘Memorandum to the General
Director: deaths following the administration of
anthelmintics in Colombia’, BV 27, RG 5, RFA-
RAC.
4Anne-Emanuelle Birn, Marriage of convenience:
Rockefeller international health and revolutionary
Mexico, Rochester, NY, University of Rochester
Press, 2006, pp. 87–8; Soma Hewa, Colonialism,
tropical disease and imperial medicine: Rockefeller
philanthropy in Sri Lanka, Lanham, MD, University
Press of America, 1995, pp. 81, 86.
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150general to do with modern medical approaches to health. Both the parent Rockefeller
Foundation and its IHB were at first reluctant to acknowledge responsibility for the
unfortunate outcomes of their vast philanthropic benevolence. Internal dynamics asso-
ciated with institutional maturation, however, and pressures from below in foreign juris-
dictions, made officers of both organizations aware of the operational shortcomings that
were behind the deaths from chenopodium poisoning among children. This process came
to a head in the late 1920s with the inquiry into the death of Jose ´ Vicente Quintero, a
ten-year-old streetsweeper from Barrio la Guacamaya, Bucamaranga, and the eventual
compensation of his family.
How Rockefeller Philanthropy Came to Treat
Jose ´ Vicente Quintero
The prototype of Rockefeller public health philanthropy was launched to treat hook-
worm disease in the southern United States from 1909 to 1913, after the affliction was
identified as a prime reason for the alleged backwardness of the region and its people.
When the Rockefeller Foundation was created in 1913 with the specific intent of devel-
oping an international programme, treating hookworm disease was deemed the perfect
“entering wedge” due to the presence of the infection in a global band that coincided
with many tropical territories of increasing interest to the United States. Within three
years the IHB had established operations in dozens of territories around the world,
with an initial concentration of efforts in Latin America and the British Caribbean, but
quickly expanding into many other parts of the tropical world. The New York office
of the IHB went through two main phases over the twenty-year period covered in this
article. During the initial tenure of Wickliffe Rose (1913–23), though its international
operations were extensive, the head office was staffed by a small group of individuals.
The director managed supervisors in the field with surprisingly little assistance, and
appointed scientific experts ad hoc to study particular issues or conduct surveys of
work underway in the field. The second directorship, under the former military doctor,
Frederick Russell, was characterized by a larger office with stricter lines of authority,
greater managerial division of labour involving specialists in statistics and record-
keeping, and a commitment to continuous public health research by a dedicated labora-
tory division and the expert evaluation of results from field operations. This model
crystallized in 1927–28 and the institution, renamed the International Health Division,
emerged triumphant following a power struggle among senior Rockefeller officers, the
legitimacy of its growing research and training role recognized by the Foundation.
5
The IHB quickly expanded its repertoire after 1914, in particular into malaria and yel-
low fever research and prevention, but treating hookworm disease remained the staple of
many of its most ambitious operations, including that in Colombia, until the early 1930s.
The Rockefeller Foundation hoped the hookworm campaigns would train local political
and medical elites in the principles and benefits of organized public health so that the
5Raymond B Fosdick, The story of the
Rockefeller Foundation, 2nd ed., New Brunswick, NJ,
Transaction, 1989, pp. 44–7; John Farley, To cast out
disease: a history of the International Health Division
of the Rockefeller Foundation (1913–1951), Oxford
University Press, 2004, pp. 158–67.
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151work would carry on after the IHB programmes ended. To promote this, the agreements
with governments embedded the hookworm missions within appropriate host state
bureaucracies, and scheduled the gradual transfer of fiscal responsibility to local treasu-
ries. Pointing out how treatment of hookworm disease on a mass scale could improve the
productivity of rural labourers often helped mobilize political and economic support for
public health, but there were other important motivations. The campaigns were also seen
as ideal vehicles for popularizing the notion that microorganisms caused disease, that
laboratory-based medicine could detect and treat such disease, and that modern hygiene
had many virtues, among them defecating in a toilet and so avoiding the dispersal of
hookworm ova. Children were always prime targets of the hookworm campaigns, in
part because they were seen as most likely to be receptive to the new message of modern
hygiene.
6
Hookworm disease, also known as ankylostomiasis and uncinariasis, is a soil-
transmitted helminthiasis. Hookworm larvae invade a human host on contact with
skin, usually the soft tissue between thet o e so ft h o s ew h og ob a r e f o o t .T h e yc o m -
plete their life cycle as they travel through the body, then attach themselves to the
intestinal mucosa of the duodenum and jejunum, and suck blood. The effect is essen-
tially cumulative—that is, the more hookworms lodged in the system, the greater the
loss of blood to the point that an iron deficiency anaemia may set in with severe,
even fatal, effects. Sufferers feel listless, experience disorienting symptoms of irregu-
lar blood flow, and become more susceptible to other diseases. The presence of
hookworms, and an idea of the degree of infection, can be detected through micro-
scopic examination of a stool sample for ova, and someone suffering infection can
usually be “cured” fairly cheaply and effectively with treatment by vermifuge fol-
lowed by a purge.
7 What separates hookworm disease from hookworm infection
is difficult to define precisely since the effects of an identical number of worms in
a human body will vary considerably according to the height, weight, nutritional
6On the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission in the
US South, see John Ettling, The germ of laziness:
Rockefeller philanthropy and public health in the new
South, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press,
1981. On the initial stages of the IHB hookworm
project, see Steven Palmer, ‘Migrant clinics and
hookworm science: peripheral origins of international
health, 1840–1920’, Bull. Hist. Med., 2009, 83 (4):
676–709; Marcos Cueto (ed.), Missionaries of
science: the Rockefeller Foundation and Latin
America, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press,
1994; Farley, op. cit., note 5 above; idem, Bilharzia:
a history of imperial tropical medicine, Cambridge
University Press, 1991, pp. 72–80; Fosdick, op. cit.,
note 5 above. Among case studies are Christian
Brannstrom, ‘Polluted soil, polluted souls: the
Rockefeller hookworm eradication campaign in Sa ˜o
Paulo, Brazil, 1917–1926’, Hist. Geog., 1997, 25:
25–45; Rita Pemberton, ‘A different intervention: the
International Health Commission/Board, health,
sanitation in the British Caribbean, 1914–1930’,
Caribbean Q., 2003, 49 (4): 87–103; Ligia Marı ´a
Pen ˜a Torres and Steven Palmer, ‘A Rockefeller
Foundation health primer for U.S.-occupied
Nicaragua, 1914–1928’, Can. Bull. Med. Hist., 2008,
25 (1): 43–69; Warwick Anderson, Colonial
pathologies: American tropical medicine, race, and
hygiene in the Philippines, Durham, NC, Duke
University Press, 2006, pp. 194–206.
7Z S Pawlowski, G A Schad, G J Stott, Hookworm
infection and anaemia: approaches to prevention and
control, Geneva, World Health Organization, 1991,
pp. 3–5; Richard W Ashford and William Crewe, The
parasites of homo sapiens: an annotated checklist of
the protozoa, helminhths and arthropods for which we
are home, London and New York, Taylor and Francis,
2003, pp. 69–70; David I Pritchard, R J Quinnell, P J
Hotez, J M Hawdon and A Brown, ‘The
immunobiology of hookworm infection’, in Celia V
Holland and Malcolm W Kennedy (eds), The
geohelminths: Ascaris, Trichuris and hookworm,
Boston, Dordrecht, and London, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2002, pp. 143–65.
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152condition and concurrent health problems of the host. People can have a considerable
degree of infection and remain asymptomatic. Nevertheless, rather than treating those
with clear signs of hookworm disease, the Rockefeller Foundation’s IHB campaigns
involved a standardized treatment regimen for all those found to have any degree of
infection. This was justified according to the logic of eradication, and it dovetailed
with the goals of health promotion because it submitted the largest possible number
of people to the ritual of medical treatment following examination and diagnosis.
8
It is far from certain, then, that Jose ´ Vicente Quintero suffered from hookworm dis-
ease when he was given his fatal dose of oil of chenopodium in a cup of panela
(brown sugar diluted in water). The doctor’s report noted that eggs of the hookworm
parasite had been found in his stool sample and that he displayed an anaemic condition
of the skin and conjunctiva, symptomatic of anaemia. Nevertheless, the ten-year-old
weighed 25 kilos and seems to have been in reasonably good health, his diet consid-
ered “common among people of his class”, and his medical history, in the opinion
of the physicians who oversaw his case, was free of malnutrition or diseases like
malaria or beriberi.
9 Many of the other children who died from overdoses of this
potentially lethal vermifuge were also probably not suffering from hookworm disease.
This is not to say that there was no medical reason to treat them. Unlike the case with
other worms like Ascaris, the greatest pathology from hookworm infection was found
in adults, but hookworm disease comes on through worm accumulation, so ridding a
host body of the parasite reduces the imminent likelihood of suffering hookworm dis-
ease. Moreover, ankylostomiasis can result in permanent malformation of a growing
body, and for this reason a case could be made for keeping children as free of the
parasite as possible.
10
Still, as soon became apparent, removing hookworms from children using oil of che-
nopodium was a very risky business. The IHB had campaigned in the US South and
through the first year of international operations using thymol, a vermifuge that had
been standard for treating hookworm since the 1880s.
11 A powerful phenol extracted
from thyme or made synthetically, thymol was problematic because its side effects
included nausea, dizziness and vomiting, and it, too, could occasionally be fatal. The
risks of treatment with thymol during the campaigns in the US South, as well as the
fact that patients, especially children, found it noxious and avoided taking it, had made
many Rockefeller men anxious to develop a vermifuge that would be at once safer and
8On this point, see Ilana Lo ¨wy, ‘“Intervenir et
repre ´senter”: campagnes sanitaires et e ´laboration des
cartographies de l’ankylostomiase’, Hist. Phil. Life
Sci., 2003, 25: 349–50.
9‘Report of case of poisoning by anthelmintic’,
BV 27, RG 5, RFA-RAC. For a portrait of what a
poor working boy’s life in a small Latin American
city might have been like at this time, see the
autobiographical sketch by Carlos Luis Fallas
(b. 1909), ‘Autobiografı ´a’, Marcos Ramı´rez, 4th ed.,
San Jose ´, Editorial Costa Rica, 1986, pp. 9–11; the
book, originally published in 1952 as Marcos
Ramı´rez: aventuras de un muchacho, is a delightful,
lightly fictionalized memoir of Fallas’ childhood on
the streets of San Jose ´, Costa Rica, 1915–1924.
10Pritchard, et al., op. cit., note 7 above, p. 147.
11Ettling, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 25; and
Rockefeller Foundation (hereafter RF)-IHB,
‘Introduction’, Bibliography of hookworm disease,
New York, RF, 1922, pp. xxii–xv; also, pp. 327–56
on publications on anthelmintics for hookworm,
1880–1921.
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153more palatable, and effective.
12 In the early twentieth century pharmacologists became
interested in vermifuges made from the chenopodium plant. The volatile oil distilled
from the fruit of Chenopodium anthelminticum, a roadside weed common in the US
(known as Baltimore Oil or American wormseed oil), had always been in the US phar-
macopoeia and long been effectively used in domestic medicine as an anthelmintic in
roundworm infections in children.
13 Increasing attention to hookworm disease around
the world motivated further research into alternatives to thymol.
14 The IHB itself com-
missioned Samuel Darling and Joseph Barber in 1914 to study the use of chenopodium
in hookworm treatment in British colonial South-East Asia. Before their study was com-
pleted the world war interrupted the supply of thymol, and IHB supervisors in the field
simply started to use oil of chenopodium instead of thymol because it was available and
inexpensive.
15
With this in mind, a number of studies were undertaken in the US, and their results
suggested that the vermifuge had potential, but was probably dangerous.
16 The warn-
ings were more than offset by a very promising report from Victor Heiser, a senior
official with the US Public Health Service in the Philippine Islands who had just
joined the IHB as its “Director of the East”.
17 In May 1915 he presented findings
based on the use of oil of chenopodium in over 100,000 cases in the hospitals of
South-East Asia for hookworm and other intestinal parasites. There, despite grave
reservations about the use of oil of chenopodium, “heretofore ...owing to its tendency
to produce untoward effects and even death”, physicians had been forced to employ it
because of the wartime scarcity and expense of thymol. Heiser had plumbed the
reports of British medical officials who had used it in many treatments, and found
not a single fatality.
18 Notably, the data were based on treatment given in hospital
facilities where the oversight of medical personnel was constant, and few of the
patients were children.
Against this sketchy and ambiguous backdrop, and knowing that circumstances had
led its mission supervisors to adopt the drug on the ground, the directors of the IHB
12Ettling, op. cit., note 6 above, pp. 228n.12,
165–7; Farley, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 41n. On
children’s distaste for thymol, Daniel M Molloy,
‘Second annual report on work for the relief and
control of uncinariasis in Nicaragua for the period
January 1st 1916 to December 31st 1916’, p. 23,
RG 5, series 3, box 150, folder 1787, RFA-RAC.
13A K Bond, ‘Death after wormseed’, Maryland
M. J., 1897, 37: 289–90.
14The chemistry of oil of chenopodium was
studied in the US by Edward Kremers and E K
Nelson of the bureau of chemistry at the US
Department of Agriculture. Dutch tropical disease
researchers, H Vervoort and Wilhelm Schu ¨ffner,
based on research in the Netherlands East Indies,
presented a paper to the 1912 International Congress
on Hygiene and Demography in Washington, DC,
advocating the superiority of chenopodium in the
treatment of hookworm disease. See Murray Galt
Motter, Hookworm disease: the use of oil of
chenopodium in its treatment, Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1914, p. 2.
15Rockefeller Foundation, Annual report, 1915,
pp. 214–21.
16Robert M Levy, ‘Oil of chenopodium in the
treatment of hookworm infections’, JAMA, 1914,
43 (22): 1946–9; also in this vein was Motter,
Hookworm disease (see note 14 above). Motter
worked in the Division of Pharmacology of the
United States Public Health Service.
17On this controversial character, see Farley, op.
cit., note 5 above, pp. 12–13; Anderson, op. cit., note 6
above, pp. 180–205; and his own memoirs, Victor
Heiser, An American doctor’s odyssey: adventures
in forty-five countries,N e wY o r k ,WWN o r t o n ,1 9 3 6 .
18Victor Heiser, ‘Report upon the experiences of
physicians in the Orient with oil of chenopodium in
the treatment of over 100,000 cases of uncinariasis
and other intestinal parasitic diseases’, pp. 1, 5, RG 5,
series 2, box 63, folder 408, RFA-RAC.
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154approved trial use of oil of chenopodium in the Central American and British Caribbean
hookworm programmes. “Experiments” in Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua on
upwards of 10,000 people produced “favorable” to “excellent” results. The drug seemed
less trying on the patients, and because oil of chenopodium was so effective in expelling
roundworms—unlike hookworms, “plainly visible to the naked eye”—it produced “a
strong psychic effect”, considered “a decided advantage in favor of this drug”.
19 Wide-
spread use of oil of chenopodium in 1916 led to reports of “alarming symptoms, and
sometimes death” in the Southern United States, Panama, Nicaragua, Ceylon and Egypt,
even though standard doses had been used. The heads of the IHB concluded from that
year’s data that “extreme caution in the use of the drug is therefore indicated until its
proper method of preparation has been learned, its chemical composition and stability
standardized, and a safe dosage and method of administration established”. Rather than
issuing formal regulations, however, they urged mission supervisors to be “extremely
discriminating in its use”.
20
A reduction in dosage in subsequent years appeared to reduce the incidence of poi-
soning, but the cases that did occur confirmed another worrisome tendency pointed
out in the pre-1915 literature: three-quarters of those affected were children of twelve
and under. None the less, the IHB directors felt that oil of chenopodium had such
great anthelmintic value, not only for hookworm but for roundworm and other para-
sites, “that the desirability of discovering methods for its safe employment justifies
additional effort”.
21 This process of discovery would take place in day-to-day cam-
paigning, using a drug and a methodology that the Foundation and the IHB directors
understood was not safe, with the children of Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia and
the southern United States as experimental subjects. The informal experiment
widened: operations were begun in 1917 in countries with large populations like
Brazil, Ceylon and India.
In 1919, the IHB launched a major hookworm campaign in Colombia. It gradually
worked through the most populous parts of the country, getting under way in Bucara-
manga in 1925. On 13 July 1926, after hookworm ova were found in the stool of Jose ´
Vicente Quintero, the child streetsweeper was given a first dose of oil of chenopodium
mixed with carbon tetrachloride and a purge with no undue effects. Eight days later,
as was the norm in the Colombian campaigns, he was subjected to a second round
of treatment, receiving ten drops of oil of chenopodium in two batches, at 6.30 and
8.00 a.m., and a purge of sulphate of magnesia an hour later. Death from an overdose
of oil of chenopodium followed a typical course, and the death of Jose ´ Vicente Quintero
was terribly typical.
22 The second dose of vermifuge soon sent him into neurotoxic
shock, and he began to vomit and exhibit signs of mental confusion and weakness. His
pulse accelerated, and he became progressively weaker until he fell unconscious. By
19Rockefeller Foundation, Annual report, 1915,
pp. 214–16.
20Rockefeller Foundation, Annual report, 1916,
pp. 220, 246–7.
21Rockefeller Foundation, Annual report, 1917,
pp. 116.
22Levy, op. cit., note 16 above, pp. 1947–9.
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1554.30 in the afternoon the boy was in convulsions and his vomit had become foamy.
He died a few minutes later.
23
Grim Tally
In 1926, just prior to the death of Jose ´ Vicente Quintero, the information gatherers at
the New York office of the IHB collated existing records and established two registries
detailing deaths following treatment for hookworm disease with oil of chenopodium.
One series, going back to 1915 and eventually stretching to 1934, contained incidents
in which the oil was the sole vermifuge, and documented 129 deaths involving treatment
by agents of the IHB. The other series, covering the period 1922–33, registered deaths
following treatment by oil of chenopodium-carbon tetrachloride mixture, and catalogued
69 fatalities involving the Rockefeller missions.
24 Taken together, the books register
195 deaths following treatment with oil of chenopodium or with carbon tetrachloride-
chenopodium mixture. Over four-fifths (150, or 81 per cent) of those who died, and
whose age was recorded, were children twelve years of age or younger. The bound
volumes, however, do not account for all recorded fatalities. For example, of 56
such Brazilian deaths reported by the mission supervisor, Lewis Hackett, in 1921, only
29 appear in the bound compendia (again, the sad tally of children was notable: 43 of
the 49 whose age was recorded were less than ten years old when they died). Such an
important discrepancy suggests that a full count of those who died following IHB treat-
ments, and whose death was reported in some form by its agents to the head office,
would require a review of all quarterly reports and associated correspondence from all
jurisdictions. The sheer volume of records involved makes such a review impractical.
The data in the bound volumes is uneven. Some deaths are exhaustively documented
with autopsy reports and correspondence between mission supervisors and field workers,
reiterated in a ‘Chronological table of contents’ that tabulates vital statistics, and gives
the interval from treatment to death, symptoms, and officers reporting. With some deaths
in the field, possibly in remote areas, or at the hands of unreliable field workers, there are
no supporting documents; all that appears is the entry in the chronological table:
“1919—2 cases—Brazil;” or “Coolie—Ceylon”.
25 Other deaths following treatment
may well have gone unrecorded, through either negligence or denial. Supervisors vir-
tually always rejected the idea that the medicine could have been responsible for a death
in the field. Instead they looked immediately to patient non-compliance with the instruc-
tions for taking either the vermifuge or the purgative (in Jose ´ Vicente’s case, the boy was
blamed for eating a fruit on the day of the treatment).
26 They might also shrug off the
23‘Report of case of poisoning by anthelmintic’,
BV 27, RG 5, RFA-RAC.
24Confusingly entitled ‘Deaths following
treatment, vol. 1, 1915–1934’, and ‘Deaths following
treatment, 1922–1933, vol. 1’, the progeny of the
binders is not known. It can be inferred that they were
both begun just prior to 1 November 1926 due to
comments made in the frontispiece. The volumes are
currently catalogued as ‘Deaths following treatment,
vol. 1, 1915–1934’, BV 27, and ‘Deaths following
treatment, 1922–1933, vol. 1’, BV 30–31, RG 5,
RFA-RAC.
25‘Chronological table of contents, deaths
following treatment with chenopodium’, BV 27,
pp. 1–17, and ‘Chronological table of contents, deaths
following treatment with carbon tetrachloride
chenopodium mixture’, BV 30, pp. 1–6, both RG 5,
RFA-RAC.
26D B Wilson to F M Read, 21 Jan. 1927, BV 27,
RG 5, RFA-RAC.
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156death as inevitable due either to severe malnutrition or to the severity of the hookworm
infection in the patient. Generally, the victim was recast as having been fatally ill—had it
not been the medicine, it would have been something else. On some occasions, doubts
were cast on the pharmaceutical quality of the vermifuge, and sometimes on the compe-
tence of the “native” dispensers. Given this culture of denial, the pressure that dispensers
were under, and the powerlessness of some of the populations treated, it is conceivable
that dispensers occasionally suppressed information about deaths when circumstance
permitted.
27
Other deaths may simply have gone unnoticed in the carnage that was estate labour.
Jose ´ Vicente Quintero was a municipal employee from a family whose father, while
poor, was literate, able to get a Catholic burial for his child, and dogged in his pursuit
of accountability under Colombian law and custom. In a legalistic proto-democracy
like Costa Rica, the death in 1917 of a Hispanic mestizo child in the rural hinterland fol-
lowing treatment with oil of chenopodium led to the arrest, incarceration, and trial of the
technical assistants who administered the drug; in the end a good lawyer ensured they
would be exonerated by the judge, but there was no possibility that the connection
between the death and hookworm treatment would go unregistered.
28 The same could
not be said if an indigenous child on a Guatemalan coffee estate suffered death following
treatment by a local or foreign white medical officer. This may explain why not a single
report of death following treatment with oil of chenopodium was registered in Guatemala
during the years 1915–21, when over 100,000 people were treated, almost exclusively
migrant indigenous workers (including women, children and infants) toiling on large
coffee estates.
29 A 1917 visit by an experienced IHB officer noted that there had been
many cases in Guatemala of toxic symptoms, but insisted there had been no fatalities
from oil of chenopodium.
30 This seems unlikely.
In any case, the data from the bound volumes, in combination with the fatalities
reported by Hackett, register 222 deaths from oil of chenopodium poisoning by the
IHB between 1914 and 1934; 193 (87 per cent) of the dead were children under thirteen
years of age. In a 1921 communique ´ to the Brazilian bulletin of the National Academy of
Medicine, Hackett used his data to advance a mortality rate of 1:46,000 in the use of oil
of chenopodium, and argued that this was low if compared to general anaesthesia with
ether (1:16,000), diphtheria antitoxin, or salvarsan.
31 However, Hackett was using fig-
ures for the number of treatments, not the number of people treated, and he did not pro-
vide a separate calculation for the under-thirteen age grouping. So, for example, in the
27Two deaths that occurred in Nicaragua in 1919
were attributed by the supervisor to severity of
hookworm disease in one case, and to malnutrition in
the other; see D M Molloy, ‘Report on work for the
relief and control of hookworm disease in Nicaragua
from September 22, 1915 to December 31, 1920’,
p. 13, RG 5, series 2, box 34, folder 202, RFA-RAC.
For Mexican responses of this kind, see Birn, op. cit.,
note 4 above, p. 87.
28Louis Schapiro to Wickcliffe Rose, 17 March
1916, RG 5, series 1.2, box 29, folder 450, RFA-
RAC.
29Emmett I Vaughan, ‘Report on work for the
relief and control of hookworm disease in Guatemala
from March 15, 1915 to December 31, 1920’, p. 6,
RG 5, series 2, box 31, folder 184, RFA-RAC.
30M E Connor, ‘Notes on Guatemala’, n.p.,
2 June 1917, RG 5, series 2, box 31, folder 184, RFA-
RAC
31Excerpt from communication from Dr Hackett
to bulletin of National Academy of Medicine, Brazil,
1921, 93 (2).
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157Brazilian campaign in 1919 there was a mortality rate of one for every 21,000 people
treated; in 1920, one for every 15,000 treated. In hookworm operations throughout Latin
America, children twelve and under accounted for roughly 30 per cent of those treated
for hookworm infection. Given that 80 per cent of chenopodium poisoning fatalities
were registered in this group, then in the first instance we would be speaking of a mor-
tality rate of about 1:9,000, in the second about 1:6,400 children under thirteen treated
with oil of chenopodium. These rates were alarming for an infection that was not neces-
sarily causing harm in the person receiving treatment, and when research was making it
increasingly clear that the risks of treating children with oil of chenopodium, especially
using the dual-dose method favoured by the IHB, were unacceptably high.
Pharmacological and Ethnopharmacological Blinders
By the time Jose ´ Vicente Quintero swallowed his second, fatal dose of chenopodium a
mere eight days after the first treatment, the extreme risk he was incurring was well
established in medical literature, much of it produced in association with IHB research-
ers. One year earlier, in 1925, for example, the IHB director Frederick Russell asked the
staff researcher, Samuel Darling, to review a similar death, that of a seven-year-old in
Puerto Rico following a second treatment after seven days. Darling responded, “I am
convinced that the interval between chenopodium treatments should be longer.” He cited
to Russell the work that had been done on this subject at the request of the IHB itself,
perhaps underlining his frustration by adding a reference to a medical primer.
We realized in the Orient that the drug was a neurotoxin and that it was cumulative in its effects....
Attention has been called to this danger in the report of the Uncinariasis Commission to the Orient,
in the ‘Treatment of Hookworm Infection,’ Journal of AMA, Febr. 1918, and in Publication no. 9.
In the article on hookworm disease reprinted from the Nelson Loose-Leaf Medicine page 486 it is
stated ... “that a period of 10–14 days should elapse between treatments, and preferably one
month.”
32
Indeed, much of the research on oil of chenopodium should have been cause for ser-
ious concern to an organization involved in the mass treatment of poor, rural dwellers
suffering anaemia and malnutrition. An important 1917 study by William Salant, a senior
pharmacologist in the US Department of Agriculture’s chemistry bureau, judged that this
highly “active” and “toxic” drug had a tendency to affect the central nervous system,
heart, respiratory system, digestive organs and kidneys, and that “in hepatic and gastro-
intestinal diseases it may likewise prove more toxic”. He also flagged the likely impor-
tance of nutritional condition in determining the toxicity of oil of chenopodium.
33 This
was followed in early 1918 by publication of the results of the IHB-sponsored experi-
ments in the Malay peninsula, the most extensive research yet on the effects of the
32Samuel Darling to Frederick Russell, 12 Sept.
1925 BV 27, RG 5, RFA-RAC.
33William Salant, ‘The pharmacology of the oil
of chenopodium with suggestions for the prevention
and treatment of poisoning’, JAMA, 15 Dec. 1917, 69
(24): 2016–17. Another study that determined that
chloroform was more effective against hookworm,
was Maurice C Hall and Winthrop D Foster, ‘Oil of
chenopodium and chloroform as anthelmintics’,
JAMA, 30 June 1917, 68 (26): 1961.
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158drug on human subjects. The authors found that oil of chenopodium could “quite possi-
bly” have a cumulative action, leading to deep and prolonged coma, followed by death,
when repeated treatments were given within a week.
34 Another 1918 study using data
collected from autopsies on two patients who had died following treatment by IHB teams
in Panama argued that oil of chenopodium should not be administered to patients suffer-
ing from a high grade of anaemia—the defining symptom of hookworm disease.
35 Each
successive study proposed a longer interval between the first and second treatments to
avoid cumulative neurotoxicity.
Complicating the picture even further is the possibility that, in many cases, what IHB
officers took to be their first administration of oil of chenopodium might actually have
had the effect of a second dose in a short interval due to the ethnopharmacological prac-
tices of the rural populations under treatment in the Americas. A concoction of the che-
nopodium plant had been used as a vermifuge in domestic medicine for hundreds
of years. As early as 1570 the Spanish king’s medical emissary to the New World,
Francisco Herna ´ndez had written that the indigenous people of Mesoamerica expelled
harmful animals from their bellies with a decoction made from the roots of epazotl.
36
The eminent botanist, Henri Pittier noted in his 1908 botanical guide to Costa Rica
that Chenopodium ambrosoides, locally known as “Apazote”, grew commonly in the
dry areas around houses, and was used in popular medicine to make an infusion that
was mixed with castor oil. “From all parts of the plant an essential oil is extracted that
is ...used to expel lumbrici, by taking a few drops in a lump of sugar.”
37 IHB supervi-
sors were quite aware of this. The Guatemalan director of hookworm operations noted in
1915 that “the Indians know chenopodium well under the name of Epa ´zotl”.
38 A hook-
worm manual for Costa Rican staff remarked that oil of chenopodium was a volatile
oil distilled from local plants whose use was “very common in South America”.
39
In Guatemala, a local agent commissioned by the IHB in 1919 to advise them on such
practices in an indigenous area, reported that all children were dewormed each
full moon, a coincidence of de-worming and the full moon noted elsewhere in Central
America.
40 Though little is known about how widespread or regular such domestic
34Samuel T Darling, M A Barber and H P
Hacker, ‘The treatment of hookworm infection’,
JAMA, 23 Feb. 1918, 70 (8): 499, 504.
35David A Roth, ‘Some dangers of the
chenopodium treatment’, South. Med. J., Nov. 1918,
11 (11): 733–4.
36Sandra L Orellana, Indian medicine in highland
Guatemala: the pre-Hispanic and colonial periods,
Albuquerque, NM, University of New Mexico Press,
1987, p. 109. See also John K Crellin and Jane
Philpott, A reference guide to medicinal plants:
herbal medicine past and present, Durham, NC, Duke
University Press, 1990, pp. 269–70, which notes that
the vernacular name “American wormseed” (also
referred to as Jerusalem oak, oak of paradise,
wormseed, Mexican tea, and pigweed) was used for
various chenopodium species, notably Chenopodium
botrys—a confusion over taxonomy due to
hybridization and the “morphological plasticity of
character” of Chenopodium ambrosoides var.
anthelminticum. See also Julia F Morton, Atlas of
medicinal plants of Middle America, Bahamas to
Yucatan, Springfield, Charles C Thomas, 1981,
p. 176.
37Henri Pittier, Ensayo sobre plantas usuales de
Costa Rica, Washington, DC, H L and J B McQueen,
1908, pp. 60–1.
38Draft notes for first quarter report from
Guatemala, 1915, p. 4. RG 5, series 3, box 140, folder
1653, RFA-RAC.
39Repu ´blica de Costa Rica, Reglamento del Depto
de Ankylostomiasis, n.p., n.d. [Imprenta Nacional,
1917], p. 17; copy found in RG 5, series 2, box 28,
folder 170, RFA-RAC.
40J W Burres, ‘Report for the first
quarter—Guatemala, 1919’, RG 5, series 3, box 140,
folder 1657, RF-RAC. Deworming on the full moon
was also noted by the IHB officer in rural Panama;
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159medical practices were, it is possible that many children received a “first dose” of che-
nopodium for hookworm from IHB dispensers dangerously soon after a dose of domestic
chenopodium for roundworm. The domestic, actual first dose would likely have been
much weaker than the IHB “first dose”—a late-nineteenth-century Baltimore doctor
had distinguished between the domestic remedy and “the oil of wormseed, prepared by
the manufacturing pharmacists”, which was a much more powerful drug and which com-
mon people were wary of due to its toxic effects.
41 Nevertheless, according to Crellin
and Philpott’s reference guide to medicinal plants in the Americas, even the milder
domestic vermifuge, once widely used in the rural United States, could be toxic on
enough occasions that it was abandoned over the nineteenth century in favour of safer
vermifuges.
42
Moreover, patent vermifuges with a stronger chenopodium base may have been sup-
planting homemade preparations in domestic medical practice. As Molloy, the Nicara-
guan director, put it in 1916, “Chenopodium anthelminticum (?) is a very common
plant in all Central America, being known by the common name Apazote. Concoctions
made from the seeds, pods and flowers of this plant are prescribed by the ‘curanderos’
in the treatment of all sorts of intestinal disorders, and its vermifugal action is known
to all. In fact, referring to it as a vermifuge, it is called ‘Tiro Seguro’—our familiar
‘Dead Shot’.”
43 Oil of chenopodium-based patent medicines using the same name
were mentioned in the reports of at least two cases of fatal poisoning of children in
Colombia following first treatment with the oil. In 1928 in Santander del Norte, not
far from where Jose ´ Vicente Quintero died, four-year-old Trinidad Navarro suffered a
similar death from poisoning. The physician, Dr G A Sua ´rez, medical chief of the field
unit, noted that the child had no chronic ailment, but had been treated over the course of
the previous year by a number of patent vermifuges, among them “Angelito”,
“Vencedor”, and “Tiroseguro”. One week later, in the same locale, five-year-old Julia ´n
Garces, who had also taken patent worm medicine over the previous year, died from che-
nopodium poisoning. The reports on their deaths did not propose any link with a prior
dose of oil of chenopodium in the patent vermifuge, nor did the covering letter by the
regional director, Hector Howard.
44
It is possible that popular knowledge of the toxic effects of chenopodium helped les-
sen the risk of poisoning by the IHB. People may have found ways to keep their children
from being treated, or ceased deworming when they knew the hookworm teams were
moving through their area. A late 1916 report from Molloy suggests the way that infor-
mation about the hookworm medicine circulated. “I have personally heard the criticism
that we were using ‘quack medicine’ (‘medicina de curandero’) more than once.” His
see Lewis Hackett to his mother, 14 Oct. 1914,
Hackett Papers, RFA-RAC; and Lewis Hackett to
Wickliffe Rose, 7 Sept. 1914, RG 5, series 3, box 152,
folder 1832, RFA-RAC. De-worming at the time of a
full moon may be related to an ancient empirical
appreciation of the lunar periodicity of reproduction
in invertebrates, including worms; see George Sarton,
‘Lunar influences on living things’, Isis, 1939, 30 (3):
425–51, p. 505. In Nicaragua many people also
thought the moon a factor in the operation of the
purgative accompanying the vermifuge; see Molloy,
op. cit., note 12 above, p. 23.
41Bond, op. cit., note 13 above.
42Crellin and Philpott, op. cit., note 36 above,
p. 270.
43Molloy, op. cit., note 12 above, p. 28.
44‘Deaths following treatment, 1922–1933’, BV
30, RG 5, RFA-RAC.
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160report also shows, however, that populations undergoing treatment might be wilfully
misled. “It was at first thought that this familiarity with the drug might be turned to
advantage; but later experience has proved that here, as elsewhere, ‘familiarity breeds
contempt’. The advantages of disguising the drug are not to be underestimated.” Molloy
endorsed mixing oil of chenopodium with eucalyptus oil to mask the identity of the
“specific drug”.
45
Disconnected Experimentalism
A peculiarity of the IHB model was its inherent and constant experimentalism. This
was related to, but went beyond, the basic sense in which, for many medical doctors
of the time, all instances of therapy were an experiment. First of all, the programme
was itself an experiment, something inscribed in the very first agreement between the
IHB and the colonial authorities of British Guiana: “to cooperate in trying out an experi-
ment ... to approximate, as nearly as practicable, complete eradication of the disease
within a selected area”.
46 And though that programme was explicitly understood as a
pilot project, virtually every phase of hookworm work, as it extended itself into more
and more areas of the globe, was conceived by its makers as the next experimental
step in a public health programme that was itself so novel as to be one large experiment.
This impulse to approach all treatment as experiment was shared by IHB officers at
every level, from the general director in New York to the mission supervisors and their
assistants on the ground. It dovetailed with an organization that was recruiting young,
research-oriented physicians from a reformed medical school system that emphasized
the scientific identity of physicians; almost without exception, advancement in the IHB
ranks depended on further research-based education within this evolving complex,
most often graduate work in public health at Johns Hopkins, a programme established
under Rockefeller auspices.
47 This culture of experimentalism, one might say, was in
the organization’s “genetic code”.
Yet it had no clear connection to the development of field protocol, something that had
fatal consequences in the case of chenopodium use. For example, formal IHB experi-
ments in field conditions in Brazil between 1918 and 1920 by Samuel Darling and
W G Smillie had led them to question whether the agency should be dispensing oil of
chenopodium to children at all. They were surprised to see that “strong vigorous children
certainly sometimes react very rapidly and alarmingly to the drug”,
48 Smillie’s main
publication contained the programmatic sub-heading, ‘Should Young Children be Treat-
ed for Hookworms?’ The answer for children under five was never with oil of chenopo-
dium. “The difficulty of their treatment and the danger to the child outweigh any
advantage to be gained by the removal of their few worms.” For those five to eight years
45Molloy, op. cit., note 12 above, p. 28.
46Rockefeller Foundation, Annual report,
1913–14, p. 71.
47Elizabeth Fee, Disease and discovery:
a history of the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene
and Public Health, 1916–1939, Baltimore,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987,
pp. 165–6.
48S T Darling and W G Smillie, Studies on
hookworm infection in Brazil, First Paper, New York,
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, 1921,
p. 36.
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161of age, his determination was that they should be given only a small dose of chenopo-
dium if they suffered from roundworms and other parasites. “One should NOT treat
them with the full dose of chenopodium in order to remove their hookworms. Children
of 8 years or less are particularly susceptible to the toxic effects of cheno or other
anthelmintics.”
49 Despite the centrality of these researchers to the scientific culture of
both the IHB and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, their findings were
never used to revise approaches in the field—indeed, the vast majority of deaths from
chenopodium poisoning between 1922 and 1934 occurred in children under eight years
old, and a number in infants of two years and less; in Guatemala (where no fatalities
were ever reported) until at least the end of 1919 infants less than one year old were
given chenopodium.
50
The casual manner in which field protocol was developed, and its disconnection
from a scientific canon, is evident in the reports of Daniel Molloy. Molloy conducted
“trials” and “experiments” on oil of chenopodium from 1916 to the end of 1920,
ranging from using different dosages to combining the drug with other vermifuges
or alternate purges. He regularly guided himself by his own experience in the
Philippines, and made reference to a wide variety of studies in the medical literature
to support his methodology and rationale. Molloy also took it upon himself to
develop his own safeguards, translating an article by Salant into Spanish for distribu-
t i o nt ot h es t a f f .
51 His reports are a testament to the lack of protocol governing inno-
vation in the field. In line with the new research orientation of medical and public
health education in the United States, the report shows that local supervisors were
allowed and encouraged to be public health scientists with some licence to use the
population under treatment as experimental subjects for tests aimed at improving
key components of the IHB’s methodology and therapy. They also enjoyed consider-
able autonomy in designing and carrying out those experiments even though they
might involve serious risk, as in the case of experiments with vermifuges.
These rather amorphous notions of experimental design, authority, and objectives were
characteristic of the medical and public health research context in the US at this time. As
Harry Marks has shown, the first two decades of the twentieth century were notable for a
diversity of research sites—research institutes, hospitals, government laboratories, speci-
alty clinics and universities—that “permitted researchers to ‘experiment’ with various
strategies for linking the scientific work of the laboratory with the problems seen in
the clinic”.
52 We can add the disparate international sites of IHB hookworm treatment
49Wilson G Smillie, Studies on hookworm
infection in Brazil, 1918–1920, Second paper, New
York, Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research,
1922, pp. 21–2; capitalization in original.
50‘Chronological table of contents—oil of
chenopodium’, and ‘Chronological table of
contents—carbon tetrachloride-chenopodium
mixture’; W T Burres, ‘Report on work for the relief
and control of hookworm disease in Guatemala from
March 15, 1915, to December 31, 1919’, pp. 5–7, RG
5, series 2, box 31, folder 184, RFA-RAC.
51Daniel M Molloy, ‘Report on work for the
relief and control of hookworm disease in Nicaragua
from September 22, 1915 to December 31, 1920’, p.
14, RG 5, series 2, box 34, folder 202, RFA-RAC;
also see Molloy, op. cit., note 12 above, pp. 24–30.
52Harry M Marks, The progress of experiment:
science and therapeutic reform in the United States,
1900–1990, Cambridge University Press, 1997,
p. 47.
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162to this quilt. Sometimes particular sites were designated for formal experimentation in
which “clinical material” and other factors could be more rigorously controlled, and spe-
cific research objectives explored, as in the case of Smillie and Darling’s work in Sa ˜o
Paolo. But just as Simon Flexner, the scientific director of the Rockefeller Institute for
Medical Research, held the notion that “the hospital was, after all, a laboratory”, there
was a strain in the research culture of the IHB that saw the vast rural clinic of its global
hookworm operations in the same way.
53
The scarce regulation of protocol for field experimentation or administration of vermi-
fuges was also a reflection of the overall decision making culture of the IHB, which John
Farley has characterized as “ad hoc and haphazard” and lacking in “long-term
planning”.
54 Both qualities are evident in a 1921 letter from Wickliffe Rose to the super-
visor of operations in Panama. Rose rather chattily wrote, “our experience as a whole
would seem to confirm your own conclusions that, all things considered, chenopodium
is the drug to use”. He went on to cite Darling and Smillie’s recent Brazil research
results, noting that “they tend to confirm the dosage previously described” and adding,
“incidentally”, that the resulting publications would be sent along to him. In this case,
the very director of the IHB acted as a highly subjective conduit for in-house research
results reaching field supervisors. Notably, his comment on dosage failed to mention
that the research of Darling and Smillie called into question whether oil of chenopodium
should be given to children at all. The implicit message was that the local supervisor was
free to draw his own conclusions, though he might want to compare them to more exten-
sive data to be mailed along later.
55
This is not to say that the IHB or the Rockefeller Foundation was passive in the face of
the hookworm deaths. From the very beginning the Foundation brought fatal episodes to
light and discussed them in their annual reports. The directors of the IHB organized stu-
dies on the best methods for administering the drug. Local mission supervisors con-
ducted their own experiments, took steps to address perceived problems following fatal
incidents, and acted to ameliorate the negative operational and public relations impact
as well as to ensure that no further deaths would occur while the campaign finished in
a particular region. New methods and reduced dosages for children were introduced in
an uneven fashion in a number of hookworm campaigns, and a new mixture of chenopo-
dium and carbon tetrachloride was tried out. This apparently led to a gradual reduction in
the incidence of fatal poisoning.
The Information Section’s own statistics show that from 1921 to 1924 the rate of
treatments per death improved notably over the 1917–20 period (from 39,346 to
82,729), as did the rate of persons treated per death (from 22,172 to 47,243).
56
This may have reflected a growing maturity and normalization in IHB procedures.
During Rose’s tenure (1913–23), experimental studies like those of Darling and
Smillie were carried out at the bidding of International Health, but under the auspices
53The 1905 quote from Flexner is cited in Marks,
ibid., p. 50.
54Farley, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 19.
55Wickliffe Rose to Fred C Caldwell, 7 Feb. 1921,
RG 5, series 3, box 153, folder 1843, RFA-RAC.
56C Williamson to Frederick Russell, 13 March
1925, BV 27, RG 5, RFA-RAC.
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163of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research. The subsequent Russell era, with
an in-house laboratory research branch, continued to register a drop in the frequency
of fatalities from oil of chenopodium. Nevertheless, how new scientific knowledge
was debated and transformed into policy remains unclear for both periods, and in
neither phase, it seems, were local supervisors instructed to follow the conclusions
of the IHB scientific experts or issued clear protocols on the administration of oil
of chenopodium.
Responsibility
In 1926 a grieving father’s letter prodded both the Rockefeller Foundation and the
IHB to confront the issue of their responsibility in these deaths. The Quintero file circu-
lated slowly from the top to the bottom of Foundation headquarters at 61 Broadway, and
up and down the IHB chain of command from New York and New Orleans to Bogota ´
and Bucamaranga, growing with every stop. The president of the Rockefeller Founda-
tion, George E Vincent, while insisting that the case was “legally and logically” not
one of liability, noted that there were questions of “good will and international feeling”
involved. He prefaced his submission of the matter to the Foundation’s lawyer, Thomas
Debevoise, with the comments: “It is a rather distressing case. If we begin to grant
indemnities for accidents of this kind it would be a precedent which would give trouble.
On the other hand, to refuse to do anything has certain unfortunate implications.”
57
A concatenation of questions, then, would dictate the consideration of the petition:
from legalistic issues of malfeasance, liability and precedent, to the vagaries of interna-
tional “good will” and unspecified negative consequences, all wrapped around a case of
undeniable human suffering.
The IHB’s hookworm campaigns were inserted into foreign states and governed by
their respective laws. As Hector Howard, the veteran director for the Caribbean area
wrote when asked to weigh in on the Quintero case, “The examination and treatments
for hookworm are carried forward under orders and regulations issued by the Chief
Health Officer of Colombia. This being true there is no obligation on the part of the
Rockefeller Foundation or the Division of the Foundation [the IHB] to grant the request
[of the boy’s father for compensation].”
58 Quintero Parra had, in fact, first gone to the
alcalde (state-appointed mayor with some judicial authority) of Bucamaranga and laid
a complaint on the death of his son. Depositions were taken from the two Colombian
physicians directing the local campaign, and from a neighbour who was willing to swear
that the boy had eaten a tropical fruit on the day of his treatment, hastening his
own death by disobeying the strict instructions to fast. The case was dropped.
59 As the
cursory investigation and quick exoneration suggests, the labouring peoples of the Latin
American, Caribbean and South Asian territories in which the hookworm programmes
57George E Vincent to Thomas Debevoise,
2 April 1929, BV 27, RG 5, RFA-RAC.
58Memorandum from Hector H Howard, 21
March 1929, BV 27, RG 5, RFA-RAC.
59D B Wilson to F M Read, 21 Jan. 1927, BV 27,
RG 5, RF-RAC.
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164took place were at this time kept, to one degree or another, from the full enjoyment of
rights in cases of this kind.
Despite enjoying such broad surrogate authority, however, the IHB did not take it
for granted, or use it to impose the hookworm treatment on rural peoples. With some
exceptions, the institution made systematic efforts to inform not just elites at all
levels of society, but also the prospective subjects of treatment, about the nature
and objectives of their programme. Written information was circulated explaining
the disease and its treatment in some detail, using both technical and popular medical
terminology (though not necessarily without a measure of obfuscation or deception,
as evidenced in Molloy’s decision to hide the identity of the vermifuge). House-to-
house visits were conducted, often in the company of regional and village notables,
to assuage doubts and offer further explanation. There were two principal motiva-
tions for this conduct. The overarching IHB objective in the hookworm campaigns
was to convince common rural people of the benefits of modern medicine and
hygiene, so coercive treatment was avoided whenever possible. In very practical
terms, the IHB determined that greater coverage could be achieved with fewer
resources if rural populations cooperated with the campaigns.
Still, because the history of international medical ethics prior to the Second
World War has not been well studied, it is worth reflecting on the ethical dimen-
sions of IHB conduct during the hookworm campaigns.
60 In the early-twentieth-
century United States, according to Susan Lederer, norms of medical ethics were
clearer than is often believed. Claude Bernard’s 1865 statement of principle of
medical and surgical morality—that no experiment should be done on a person if
it might be at all harmful, not even if the results could advance scientific knowl-
edge or be of benefit to others—was one such accepted norm. Lederer also under-
lines the widespread approval in the US medical community for William Osler’s
1907 dicta that every new procedure should have clear therapeutic benefit, patient
consent should be secured before experimental trials, prior testing on animals
should be done to establish “absolute safety” for man, and doctors should not
experiment on patients in their care unless direct benefit to the individual was
likely to follow.
61 As for the need to effect a certain treatment on particular indi-
viduals or groups, Martin Pernick has shown how a utilitarian calculus that
weighed the issue of risk versus benefit had become characteristic of US medical
practice by the late nineteenth century.
62
Such considerations would have been the main ethical reference points for the IHB
doctors recruited for administration, research and foreign fieldwork. Many came from
the rejuvenated US military medical service and the US Public Health Service. The
mission to eradicate hookworm was formed in the image of the yellow fever work
60Robert Baker, ‘The history of medical ethics’,
in W F Bynum and Roy Porter (eds), Companion
encyclopedia of the history of medicine, London and
New York, Routledge, 1993, vol. 2, pp. 852–97, on
pp. 871–2.
61Susan E Lederer, Subjected to science: human
experimentation in America before the Second World
War, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,
1995, pp. 1, 11–12.
62Martin A Pernick, A calculus of suffering: pain,
professionalism, and anesthaesia in nineteenth-
century America, New York, Columbia University
Press, 1985.
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165undertaken in Cuba and Panama, and Walter Reed’s pioneering programme to estab-
lish informed consent during the yellow fever inoculations in Havana was part of
their inheritance. Others were products of the new medical training culture of the
United States, in which Osler was a central reference point. Even closer to home,
the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research—administratively separate from Inter-
national Health, but under a shared umbrella of medical philanthropy and whose
research resources were mobilized by the IHB between 1913 and 1923—had been in
the sights of US anti-vivisectionists since its creation. In 1912 Hideyo Noguchi, one
of its prominent researchers, had received a great deal of negative publicity for experi-
ments conducted on children, including orphans, in an effort to develop a diagnostic
test for syphilis.
63
The actions of IHB scientists and field supervisors corresponded to this heteroge-
neous and elastic ethical map. Darling and Smillie’s experiments in Brazil are a
good case in point. Smillie had a long history of using incarcerated populations as
experimental subjects, both inside the US and abroad, and it was typical that he
sought out a population of wage labourers on a coffee plantation in Brazil to conduct
his experiments. Not only was the study designed to ensure that the experimental
subjects were essentially without rights by choosing “large coffee plantations in iso-
lated communities” where “the colonists are under strict discipline” and the planta-
tion owners highly cooperative, it was clearly designed to test limits.
64 As the
authors wrote about oil of chenopodium, “We have had a good opportunity to
observe its toxic effects, for we have given the maximum dose a great many times
in the test treatment.”
65 Not surprisingly, three deaths from chenopodium poisoning
were clinically documented during their year of experimentation, one of an eight-
year-old girl.
Because the programmes were embedded in local state institutions and operated
under local public health laws, the most important sanction was that which came
from the political and medical elites of the countries and territories where hookworm
operations were taking place. Given the nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments of
a growing portion of this community, the IHB had to step lightly due to its associa-
tion with a name that was synonymous with US capitalism. Witness Hackett’s sub-
mission to Brazil’s National Academy of Medicine, mentioned earlier, in an
attempt to reassure leading medical figures that there was no problem with oil of
chenopodium because its risks were well within established medical norms.
66 The
ethical sanction of the local medical community was especially important precisely
because IHB missions were not staffed by US nationals operating with some sort of
diplomatic immunity; other than the director, staff for hookworm operations were
63Lederer, op. cit., note 61 above, pp. 11–12.
64Samuel Darling and W G Smillie, ‘Report of
field research work on hookworm infection of the
Institute of Hygiene, Part 1’, p. 2, RG 5, series 2, box
23, folder 138, RFA-RAC. On Smillie’s experimental
approach, see Farley, op. cit., note 5 above,
pp. 161–2. The Brazilian experiments are discussed
by Brannstrom in order to describe the social
geography of the areas in question, op. cit., note 6
above, pp. 40–1.
65Darling and Smillie, op. cit., note 48 above,
p. 34.
66Hackett, op. cit., note 31 above.
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166recruited from among local physicians and dispensers who were often professional,
intellectual and moral authorities at the regional or national level. The importance of
this is evident in the response to the Quintero death, where the medical supervisor of
the hookworm campaign in the Santander region, Dr Rafael Usca ´tegui Mantilla,
pressed the Rockefeller Foundation to address the father’s claim, and informed them
for the first time of a precise sum, 100 pesos (that he had perhaps negotiated). In a let-
ter of January 1929 the eminent physician from a clannish Bucamaranga community of
doctors reiterated the blameless nature of the death, but underlined that “this misfor-
tune has been most cruel” to a man who was “in extreme poverty”. He informed the
Foundation that he wished to “add my request to that of Quintero, an unfortunate work-
man, for the purpose of making him sympathetic toward the Foundation instead of
bearing a grudge”.
67
The conjuncture and setting clearly helped to motivate a consideration of Quintero
Parra’s—and Usca ´tegui’s—request. By the late 1920s the IHB had given more hook-
worm treatments in Colombia than in any other place in its worldwide operations
(some 2.5 million treatments to 1.362 million people). Colombian physicians had dis-
played some medical nationalist irritation about the scale and style of the IHB’s
intervention, and this had spilled over into a dispute over the interpretation of a yel-
low fever outbreak, one of whose scenes was played out in Bucamaranga in 1923.
The mid- to late-1920s was also a time of increasing anti-US feeling in Colombia,
which took on a specifically anti-Rockefeller tinge in protests and labour action in
1924, and again in 1927, against the Tropical Oil Company, a subsidiary of Standard
Oil, the corporate flagship of Rockefeller enterprises. This in turn was part of a gen-
eral period of social unrest in Colombia between 1926 and 1929 that peaked in a
banana strike against another symbol of US imperial capital, the United Fruit Com-
pany, and an infamous massacre in Cie ´nega of striking workers by the army in
December of 1928.
68 The stormy context may have been part of the reason that
the letter caught the attention of John D Rockefeller, and could explain Vincent’s
thoughts on international good will and the avoidance of “certain unfortunate
implications”. It might also account for Usca ´tegui’s decision to serve as intermediary
for Quintero Parra and press the case with his US employers, after Quintero Parra
repeatedly requested compensation and made a “continual clamor” to the “employees
who took part in the hookworm campaign”.
69
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Toward Responsibility in International Health
167The ethical milieu of US medical education and practice, the growing institutional
awareness of the fatalities resulting from a disjuncture between research findings and
field protocol, and the moral and political voice of local professional and patient
communities, all combined to move the IHB, and the Rockefeller Foundation, toward
accepting some measure of responsibility for chenopodium poisonings. This is visible
as early as Hackett’s 1917 notes on the death of three children under ten in Brazil.
The state examiner exonerated the IHB following autopsies, and Hackett attributed
the deaths to an “unfortunate accidental conjunction of our treatment with certain
pathological conditions which could not have been anticipated”. Still, the graduate
of Harvard medical school concluded that “the medicine cannot ...be wholly exon-
erated, and it is believed in the laboratory that Chenopodium is too powerful a
depressant for young children when followed after a considerable interval by a saline
purgative alone”.
70 An explicit, if offensively jocular recognition of responsibility
can be found in comments made by the mission director of the Mexican hookworm
programme, Andrew Warren, who had presided in 1926 over a number of fatal poi-
sonings of children following treatment with oil of chenopodium, formally refusing
to take responsibility each time with the usual repertoire of arguments. On 15 July
of that year, however, Warren boasted in a memorandum sent to the general director,
Russell (as it happened, during the interval between Jose ´ Vicente Quintero’s first and
second doses), that “the confidence of the people is such that we can kill a member
of the family with chenopodium and the other members will demand that they con-
tinue to receive their treatment”.
71
Coming as it did only three months later, Juan de la Rosa Quintero Parra’s petition
to John D Rockefeller for compensation for the death of his son suggests a more
complicated picture, as does the response of the Rockefeller Foundation and the
IHB themselves to the father’s request. By 1927 the IHB had its own in-house
research facility to evaluate the report on the Quintero death. Wilbur Sawyer, head
of the new laboratory, reviewed the file for Russell in March, and reiterated that
the interval of eight days between the two treatments of Jose ´ Quintero was,
“I believe, shorter than one can safely use as a routine procedure” (he argued for a
minimum lapse of fourteen days).
72 The Rockefeller Foundation’s lawyer approved
the idea (initially suggested by the Colombian physician, Usca ´tegui) of its president,
Vincent, of a “small gift, made as you suggest personally by your representative in
the Field” as a “good investment”.
73 According to the regional director Hector
Howard, this was also the wish of “Mr Rockefeller”, who instructed the 100 pesos
be given to Quintero “as coming from an anonymous party”.
74 Finally, even this dis-
guise was dropped and on 7 September 1929, the cusp of the great global slump,
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168Juan de la Rosa Quintero Parra received a cheque for 100 pesos made out in his
name on the Bogota ´ account of the IHB’s Anti-anemia Commission.
75
Conclusion
It is quite extraordinary (though not atypical for the audacious historical actor in
question) that at the very moment it was deploying a new methodology to accom-
pany an unprecedented international intervention, the Rockefeller Foundation’s
IHB rather casually embarked on a near-total shift in medicinal regime to a vermi-
fuge that was widely considered more dangerous than the previous standard treat-
ment with thymol. Equally amazing and typical, the shift was informally fashioned
as an extensive, ongoing evaluation of overall effectiveness of the drug within vary-
ing approaches to mass public health treatment. Yet the growing concern of the
Foundation and the IHB for these deaths, displayed in their publications and their
record-keeping from the outset of the campaigns, shows that its officers were not
fully comfortable with the moral shield afforded by their operating according to
the laws of other countries. In disparate, only occasionally perceptible, ways this
moral unease married with managerial discomfort and a growing ability of actors
in foreign jurisdictions to exert pressure, and worked its way through the IHB across
the 1920s.
The nexus of factors played some role in reducing the incidence of fatalities fol-
lowing treatment with oil of chenopodium, and helped to promote more rigorous
record keeping on such episodes. In the Quintero case, an institutional determination
that scientific knowledge had not been rigorously applied to field protocol, combined
with influence brought to bear from below, led this first great actor of international
health to the conclusion that responsibility had to be accepted in the event of tragic
harm done to the health of patients and their families—even poor ones on the periph-
ery. In this sense, the response of the IHB to the death of Jose ´ Vicente Quintero, a
ten-year-old street sweeper from Bucaramanga, traces an early institutional encounter
with issues that would continue to be of concern in the just prosecution of global
health: squaring ethical frameworks with scientific findings and operational objec-
tives, formulating strict protocol, avoiding the tendency to value economic and pro-
grammatic expediency more than the risk that poor people might suffer, and
appreciating the ethno-medical cultures of those who engage, whether they like it
or not, the emissaries of biomedical models of health.
B yt h et i m eJ u a nd el aR o s aQ u i n t e r oP a r r ar eceived the money that surreptitiously
compensated him for the responsibility of the Rockefeller Foundation for the death of
his son, Jose ´ Vicente, the IHB had mostly given up hookworm campaigning, with the
exception of a limited number of programmes in parts of Asia, especially Ceylon,
and indeed in Colombia, that carried on until 1934, claiming the lives of nine
more poor young souls along the way. For his part, Quintero Parra had no illusions
about the nature of the compensation he had received, or its value in the political and
75Receipt for 100 pesos signed before two
witnesses by Juan de la Rosa Quintero Parra, verified
by G Bevier, Colombian mission supervisor,
BV 27, RG 5, RFA-RAC.
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169moral economy of international health. A month after cashing the cheque, he mailed
another letter to New York City, this time directed to “Frederick Russell, MD, The
Rockefeller Foundation”:
The object of these lines is to give sincere and loyal expression to my deep gratitude for the man-
ner in which you received my humble petition concerning the death of my never-to-be-forgotten
son. I bought a cow with the hundred pesos received; it provides us with milk, and every day
we think or give utterance to the worthless but eloquent phrase of the beggar: “God will reward
you.” Please accept my respectful salutations and best wishes for your health and happiness.
Very truly yours,
Juan de la R Quintero Parra
76
76Juan de la R Quintero Parra to Frederick
Russell, 12 Oct. 1929, BV 27, RG 5, RFA-RAC.
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